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In the 1980s and 1990s the North Sea emerged as a key non-OPEC oil 
producing province. Yet today overall production is declining, in both the 
British and Norwegian sectors and the big oil companies and investors 
are losing interest in what they now see as a mature province. But 
apparent maturity is not a bar to new prospects and new possibilities. This 
paper analyses not merely the still significant potential of the North Sea, 
but also the wider and increasingly attractive prospects offered by the 
opening up of the High North, the Barents Sea and part of the Arctic 
region – all  areas of rapidly growing interest which are on Europe’s 
doorstep. Success will depend heavily on key questions such as the world 
oil price trend, technological advance and the structure of fiscal regimes 
for oil and gas extraction. But the opportunities are there and they could 
be to Europe’s great advantage. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Overview 
The North Sea emerged as a key, non-OPEC oil producing area in the 1980s and 1990s. Its 
political stability and proximity to major European consumer markets have given it a major 
role in world oil and natural gas markets as well as making it a reliable supplier for Europe. 
Yet today, Europe seems to be shifting its attention away from the North Sea and drifting into 
bigger dependence on oil and gas from politically less stable areas. According to the European 
Union (EU) Commission (2006), if present consumptions patterns continue in the EU, oil and 
gas imports are likely to increase significantly over the next 25 years, with the bulk of them 
coming not from the North Sea but from Russia, North Africa and the Middle East.  
 
It is true that the North Sea can today be described as a mature province, in the sense that 
production has peaked and the remaining reserves to be exploited are smaller and/or more 
technically challenging than those developed in the past. But a mature province is not 
necessarily a dying province that is slipping into history. Other basins, such as the Gulf of 
Mexico, have undergone similar up-and-down-and-up life cycles. The Gulf of Mexico has 
become one of the hottest exploration areas in the world, just a few years after it has been 
declared a dead sea for exploration potential. 
 Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 2 of 25 
There are those who seek to by-pass the issue of future reliable oil and gas supplies by 
arguing that the European energy future lies less with fossil fuels than with renewable sources 
and, in the longer term, with a renewed expansion of nuclear power. These sources will play 
their part, although the recent increased EU target of 20 percent of European energy from 
renewables by 2020 looks unrealistically ambitious, while nuclear power expansion remains 
fraught with political difficulties, as well as severe financial challenges. A degree of realism is 
therefore urgently needed. According to the International Energy Agency (2006), fossil fuels 
will remain the dominant source of energy up to 2030. The share of oil will drop, but oil will 
still be the largest single fuel in the energy mix in 2030. Applying this template to Europe in 
2030, the expectation is that 35 percent of total energy consumption will still come from oil 
and 27 percent from gas – the crucial difference from today’s supply pattern being that 90 
percent of the oil required will be met from imports and at least 80 percent of gas from 
imports – the bulk of this from Russia, Africa and the Middle East (EU Commission, 2006). 
 
It is little wonder many Europeans are uneasy at this prospect and are beginning to search in 
different directions. In the telling words of Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign affairs High 
Representative and spokesman, ‘we should go and look for more oil and gas’... and the world, 
more precisely Europe, ‘should look for a reliable supplier’. At least for Europe it could be 
right on its doorstep. Or in the blunter words of the Norwegian Foreign Minister ‘Europe 
should begin to look North’. 
 
1.2.  Objective 
It is against such a background of anxiety and fresh thinking that this paper seeks to analyse 
not merely the remaining potential of the North Sea (the UK and Norwegian shelves) but also 
the wider regional potential offered by the opening up of the High North and the Barents Sea Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 3 of 25 
– areas which are indeed ‘on Europe’s doorstep’, or at least extensively linked by an 
expanding pipeline system, and with a potential capacity to keep Western Europe well and 
reliably supplied for many years ahead.  
 
In particular, the paper seeks to show that the North Sea’s role as a major oil and gas source is 
very far from ending, that both the UK and Norway have a major further role to play in oil 
and gas supplies, but that the success of this will depend heavily on key matters such as the 
future world oil price trend, the pace of technological advance and the design of fiscal 
regimes for oil and gas extraction. It is certainly the case that UK North Sea oil and gas 
deposits have been depleted very fast in recent years. But in the North Sea as a whole, 
including the Norwegian sector, lot of discoveries are awaiting development. One third of its 
oil and gas reserves, as currently identified, have not yet been produced. Substantial 
opportunities remain to be accessed. The limitations are profitability (largely determined by 
oil price and fiscal regimes) and technology, rather than resources.  
 
In sum, the North Sea, as we know it today, can either face a rapid decline, hence exposing 
Europe to an increasing dependence on oil and imports, or production can be sustained for a 
longer period of time, hence extending the benefits to consumers, companies and government 
alike. At the same time, if Europe is to face its energy future in a spirit of hard realism then 
the search must extend beyond and above the North Sea, to other regions, namely the Barents 
Sea and the high Arctic north. Together with the UK and Norwegian Continental Shelves, 
already largely explored, these areas, admittedly more distant and more difficult, are 
nevertheless the ones which could substantially change the geopolitics of both oil and even 
more of gas – at least from the European perspective. 
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1.3.  Methodology and Structure 
 
The analysis which follows is designed to solidify and give substance to some of the 
inevitable speculative assessments of oil and gas potential in these regions. It is largely based 
on official forecasts and estimates of remaining reserves. It considers the impact of various oil 
price scenarios on the exploration and production activities and it assesses the all-important 
prevailing fiscal impact on the profitability, hence attractiveness of the northern region, both 
the existing North Sea province and the new areas further north.  
 
The paper falls into four parts. After this Introduction, Section 2 analyses the potential of the 
main players in the North Sea and the higher north regions, namely the UK and Norway. 
Section 3 studies the issues which arise in assessing the factors which will or could lead to an 
unlocking of potential reserves. These include oil price trends, fiscal regimes and 
technological innovation as well as pipeline availability and other infrastructure 
developments. To obtain the full picture account needs also to be taken of the growth of 
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facilities and transportation within the Northern European and 
North Sea regions. Section 4 incorporates the summary and conclusions about the entire 
region and its relevance for Europe’s energy future. 
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2.  EUROPE , THE NORTH SEA AND THE HIGH NORTH 
2.1.  General: The North Sea, past, present and future. 
The Past 
The discovery of oil in the North Sea came at a critical time in the history of the world oil 
market. In the 1970s, fundamental changes in the world oil market began to take place. Prices 
rose steadily from 1970 to 1973, when the price upsurge took off which left world oil prices 
in mid-1977 at approximately eight times their level in 1970. At the same time, the OPEC 
countries, by means of participation agreements and nationalization, took control of 
producing operations away from the oil companies (Robinson and Morgan, 1978). Despite 
being a relatively high cost region for oil and gas production, its political stability and 
proximity to European consumers have allowed the North Sea to play a major role in world 
oil markets.   
 
Present 
The North Sea has been a sizable oil producer. It has emerged as a key, non-OPEC oil 
producing area in the 1980s and 1990s. As already noted its political stability and proximity 
to major European consumer markets have allowed it to play a major role in world oil and 
natural gas markets as well as being a reliable supplier for Europe. Norway and the UK – the 
North Sea’s largest producers – together account for 5.7 percent of global supplies. Within 
Europe, the two countries hold the vast majority of oil and gas resources, account for 84 
percent of the continent’s production, and meet over 25 percent of total oil consumption 
needs (Global Insight, 2007).  
 
Today, however, oil output from those two large producers has peaked and entered a period 
of long term decline, driven by the maturing of many of the North Sea’s major fields and a Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 6 of 25 
lack of significant new discoveries. During 2006, oil production in the North Sea reached 4.4 
million barrels per day (bbl/d), down from 4.7 million bbl/d in 2005. By 2007, production 
levels were about one-quarter lower than that in 1999 (EIA, 2007). In the case of natural gas, 
the North Sea is also seen as a mature region. Only Norway has seen an increase in natural 
gas production in recent years, while the UK became a net gas importer in 2004. But the 
North Sea’s importance as a key supplier of natural gas will continue, given the significant 
increase in natural gas consumption in Europe in the near future. In these circumstances the 
North Sea region is bound to remain an important source of natural gas for Europe, second 
only to Russia in total supply to the EU (EIA, 2007). 
 
Future 
The maturity of the North Sea oil by no means implies that the oil and gas era has ended in 
this province. Other basins, such as the Gulf of Mexico, have undergone similar evolutions 
and seen activity actually increase (Ruairidh, 2003). Also, it should not be forgotten in 
concentrating on the more northerly scene that North Sea potential lies not only in the UK 
and Norway. The Denmark and the Netherlands are also important oil and more importantly 
gas suppliers to Europe (especially given the various infrastructure and pipelines that link 
them to the rest of the North Sea) although Denmark’s situation is different to other North 
Sea countries due to its predominantly tight chalk reservoirs with lower production but later 
peaking and slower decline (Wurtzen, 2007). The Netherlands, which has been an established 
gas source for northern Europe for several decades, nevertheless still possesses a significant 
number of marginal fields awaiting development. According to McKellar (2006), the Dutch 
North Sea is still an interesting core region and integral part of any ‘gas in Europe’ strategy.  
A closer examination of the North Sea situation in relation to the UK now follows. Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 7 of 25 
2.2.  The UK Continental Shelf  
The UK holds 30 per cent of total proven oil reserves in the North Sea. It remains a larger   
gas producer than Norway but now (2007) second to Norway in oil production at 1.5 million 
bbl/d, or 34 per cent of both sectors, the British and the Norwegian, combined.  
 
Nonetheless, the UK ranks high in the global league of oil and gas producers. In 2004, 
production from the UK Continental shelf (UKCS) accounted for  more oil and gas than 
Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia or Kuwait (Crawford, 2006); producing 1.3bnbbl of oil and 
gas in total, sufficient to provide over 80 percent of the nation’s total energy needs (Oil & 
Gas UK, 2006). The UK remains a major non-OPEC oil producer. In 2006, it had 4.0 billion 
barrels (bnbbl) of proven crude oil reserves, by far the largest of any EU member country 
(EIA, 2007). In the same year (2006), oil production reached 588 million bbl, providing 
respectively 96 percent of the nation’s oil and gas consumption. 
 
The UK has been a net exporter of crude oil since 1981. Its largest export destinations in 
2004 were the United States (28 percent), and other European countries (52 percent), chiefly 
the Netherlands, Germany and France (EIA, 2007).  
 
Actual oil production in the UK sector peaked in 1999 at 2.9 million bbl/d, and has been 
declining since. The two main reasons given for this decline are, firstly, the overall maturity 
of the UKCS oil fields and, secondly, the declining size of fields, both in terms of new 
discoveries and developments. Additionally, increasing unit extraction costs, in what is 
acknowledged to be one of the highest cost basins in the world, are damaging project 
economics and basin competitiveness. A shift of basin production to more remote and 
inhospitable areas of the UKCS is also a factor. Crude oil exports have followed a similar Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 8 of 25 
path to production, although they initially levelled off between 1999 and 2000 before slowly 
declining. Crude oil imports have risen steadily to narrow substantially the gap with exports 
although the UK still just remains a net exporter of crude (DTI, 2005).  
 
In terms of natural gas, the UK is the fourth-largest producer of natural gas in the world. But 
in 2004, the country became a net importer of natural gas for the first time since 1996. In 
2006,  gas production reached 85 billion cubic meters (bcm) providing 92 percent of the 
nation’s gas needs (Oil & Gas UK, 2006).  
 
Since 1975, the UKCS has undergone major changes. One fact that clearly emerges is the 
decline in the average size of fields during the 1990s, compared with the early development 
of the North Sea. Discoveries now average at 20-30 million barrels of oil equivalent 
(mmboe). This is 50 to 100 times smaller than the fields on which the North Sea was built 
(Oil & Gas UK, 2006).  
 
A minority of fields account for the majority of aggregate reserves. The largest five fields 
account for 37 percent, the largest 10 for 52 percent and the largest 20 for 71 percent of the 
total reserves (Watkins, 2000). However, 29 of the UK major UK fields peaked prior to 1994 
(DTI, 2005). By 2000, they had total oil production declines of more than 50 percent from 
their maximum production levels (Blanchard, 2000).  
 
To counteract the rapid decline of mature fields, new but smaller fields are being brought on-
line at an increasing rate. From 1985 to 2006, the number of producing fields on the UKCS 
has increased three-fold. Although it took 25 years for the first 100 fields to be brought on-
line it took only six years to bring the second 100 fields on-line (Blanchard, 2000). As might Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 9 of 25 
be expected, however, the fields found during subsequent periods have become progressively 
smaller, with an average discovery size of 25 to 30 mmbbl of oil equivalent. That is modest 
compared to the larger UK fields, like Forties and Brent, with an average size above 
2,400mmboe (Sem and Ellerman, 1997). Furthermore, many of the new smaller fields have 
lifetimes of 10 years or less. In an extreme example, Dauntless field was brought on-line in 
August 1997 and was terminated in April 1999 (Blanchard, 2000).  
 
In a survey carried out by Nakhle (2005), 40 percent of respondents agreed that despite the 
maturity of the UKCS, the UK North Sea era has not ended yet. Similarly, according to a 
study carried out by UKOOA and WoodMackenzie in 2004, there are still substantial 
opportunities to be accessed if the UK remains internationally competitive and can sustain 
current investment. If successful the UK could still be producing the equivalent of 65 percent 
of its total oil requirements in 2020 and delay decommissioning by 10-15 years, making a 
major contribution to the UK’s security of energy supply. In stark contrast, if the UK 
becomes less attractive to new investment, then the UKCS will only provide the equivalent of 
15 percent of total UK oil demand by 2020 (Oil & Gas UK, 2006). Consequently, the UKCS 
can either face a rapid decline, hence exposing the UK to an increasing dependence on oil 
imports, or production can be sustained for a longer period of time, hence extending the 
benefits to various stakeholders. The same scenarios apply to gas. The UK will remain a 
significant producer of gas for years to come. According to Oil & Gas UK (2006), current 
production plans are only expected to deliver about 10 percent of UK gas demand in 2020, 




                                                 
1 Section 3 discusses the factors that can affect the future of the UKCS. Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 10 of 25 
2.3.  The Norwegian Continental Shelf of the North Sea 
The claim has been made that Norway is, or could become, Europe’s Saudi Arabia (Faris, 
2007). Norway ranks as the world’s fifth largest oil exporter and the tenth largest oil 
producer. The country is a significant oil exporter; because it consumes a relatively small 
amount of oil each year. Thus it is able to export the vast majority of its oil production. In 
2005, Norway was the third largest gas exporter and the seventh largest gas producer in the 
world. In 2005 Norway exported 2.2 million bbl/d of oil, supplying 17 per cent of the EU 
total gas demand and 13 per cent of its oil demand (The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2007). 
 
Despite more than 30 years of activity, the Norwegian side of the North Sea still has 
significant oil and gas deposits to develop. Norway contains the bulk of oil reserves in the 
North Sea (57 per cent). It is also the largest producer of oil with 2.5 million bbl/d or about 
57 per cent. Together with the Netherlands, Norway accounts for over three-fourths of gas 
reserves (EIA, 2007). Most Norwegian gas is sold through long term deals to Britain and 
other European countries.  
 
When the North Sea was opened up for petroleum activity, the most promising areas were 
explored first. This led to world class discoveries which were then put into production. These 
fields have been and still are of great significance for the development of the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS). The large fields have contributed to the establishment of 
infrastructure that subsequent fields have been able tie into. Although Norwegian oil 
production in the North Sea started to decline in 2000, there is still a considerable potential 
for value creation in these areas if the recovery rate in producing fields is increased, 
operations streamlined and resources near existing infrastructure are explored. Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 11 of 25 
According to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2006), Norway has a potential for 
maintaining profitable oil production from the North Sea for another 50 years and its gas 
production for another 100 years. Since Norway exports more than 90 per cent of its oil 
production this makes it a continuing and significant factor on the global energy supply 
scene.  
 
Oil production from the NCS of the North Sea peaked at 3.4 mbbl/d in 2001 (Global Insight, 
2007). But while oil production has started its inevitable decline, gas production is on the 
increase. By 2007, Norway’s annual gas production reached 85 bcm. According to foreign 
ministry forecasts from Oslo, early in the next decade (2010), Norway’s gas exports will have 
risen by 50 per cent to 130 bcm. This means that exports from Norway will by then account 
for nearly a third of natural gas consumption in France, Germany and the UK.  
 
A conservative estimate indicates that so far Norway has produced one third of its proven 
petroleum resources (Foreign Ministry, 2007). This is good news for customers in the West, 
since energy demand is increasing and a politically stable supply network is of the utmost 
importance (Faris, 2007). For over 30 years, oil from the NCS has found its way to US 
markets. Now the time has come for natural gas.  
 
2.4.  Beyond the North Sea; a New Sea of Opportunities? 
Already a new source pattern is opening out. Norwegian oil and gas are not coming from the 
North Sea only. Norway’s oil and gas potential as a whole comes not only from the North 
Sea, but also from the Norwegian and the Barents Seas.  
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In the ‘established’ North Sea itself, about 57 per cent of proven oil and gas reserves have 
been produced. The remaining reserves are divided 34 per cent oil and 66 per cent gas. But 
further north in the Norwegian Sea only about 25 per cent of oil and gas reserves have been 
produced. The remaining reserves are 35 per cent oil and 65 per cent gas (The Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 2007). One third of Norway’s remaining petroleum reserves are 
estimated to be in the Barents Sea (Foreign Minister, 2007). Thus, the Norwegian 
hydrocarbon energy story, which started in the North Sea proper, is already moving north into 
the Norwegian Sea, into the High North, and stretching beyond the Arctic Circle into the 
Barents Sea. Another world of energy beckons. 
 
On April, 24, 2006, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre published, in the Swedish 
newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, a highly significant letter article entitled “A sea of 
opportunities”. In that letter Store urged the EU to look north for energy. Increased extraction 
of oil and natural gas from the Barents Sea could provide Europe with its much needed 
energy, the minister said. The letter sketched a European energy scenario focusing on the ice-
packed northern parts of the planet. The traditional conception of the world, the Minister 
pointed out, classically defined with Europe in the middle, and America and Asia on the outer 
wings was only one way of looking at the map. If we instead placed the Nordic areas in the 
centre, the perspective changed dramatically. The Arctic Ocean then became a mutual sea 
between Europe, Russia and North America. 
 
2.5.  The High North 
The High North covers the areas of the Arctic adjacent to Norway, the northernmost parts of 
Scandinavia and Russia, and the ocean areas to the north of these countries. Estimates by the Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 13 of 25 
US Geological Survey  indicate that the High North holds a quarter of the world’s 
undiscovered oil and gas resources.  
 
The Barents Sea is a part of the Arctic Ocean located north of Norway and Russia. It is 
bordered by the shelf edge towards the Norwegian Sea in the west, the island of Svalbard 
(Norway) in the northwest, and the islands of Franz Josef land and Novaya Zemlya (Russia) 
in the northeast and east. 
 
These are without doubt difficult areas with heavy extraction costs. No-one questions that. 
But what now places them firmly on the energy agenda is the ever-rising security of supply 
anxieties across the world. What four years ago looked like remote geologist’s speculation, 
well beyond the range of commercial consideration now begins to appear quite different. Top 
US, European Union, Russian and Norwegian officials now agree that the Barents Sea has 
great potential to be a new world-class petroleum province and a key energy provider for 
Europe and the US (Howell and Nakhle, 2007). 
  
To date there has been little exploration activity in the Barents Sea to reflect this new interest 
and the region remains by far the least explored part of the NCS. Two commercial 
discoveries have been made so far – the Snøhvit gas field and the Goliat oil field. These 
encouraging discoveries have confirmed that there are more resources to be found. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that when added to the high oil price and a background of Norwegian 
political stability the overall conditions and prospects are prompting increasingly hard 
thinking about new investments and plans in the area. 
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Statoil’s Snøhvit (Snow White) field is the first field development in Norway using natural 
gas liquefaction technology and the northernmost LNG development in the world. Snøhvit is 
significant not only for its reserves but also for the fact that it is Europe’s first LNG export 
terminal. The project was expected to begin operations in 2005, but cost overruns have 
pushed back the start-up date until 2007. The development of Snøhvit provides a basis for 
further field developments in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea based on LNG. In April 
2006, for the first time, gas from the "Snohvit" gas reservoirs in the Barents Sea has been 
brought to the land surface. The gas, which is located 2500 meters under the sea floor was 
brought to the surface without emissions to the surrounding. From deep-sea wells in the 
frosty Barents Sea, gas would flow to shore through an underwater pipeline. There are no 
platforms or ships on the surface. Snohvit will provide a significant contribution to overall 
Norwegian gas production. At the same time, the fields entail establishment of new 
infrastructure that can serve future field developments. 
 
Meanwhile, as the world's largest consumer of energy, the U.S. is increasingly looking to 
diversify its imports away from politically unstable areas such as the Middle East. By autumn  
2007, shipments of LNG from the Snohvit field in the Barents Sea will sail to the Cove Point 
terminal in Maryland – creating yet another bond between the US and Norway across the 
Atlantic. The Barents Sea could offer the U.S. a stable alternative supply of both crude and 
liquefied natural gas. The EU should surely be looking the same way.  
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3.  THE CRUCIAL FACTORS AFFECTING NORTH SEA AND HIGHER NORTH 
INVESTMENT  
The future of the North Sea depends on the level of investment in exploration and 
development activities, which in turn depends on a combination of factors. In the UKCS, for 
instance, continued investment has the potential almost to halve the production decline rate to 
the end of the decade from seven percent per annum to four percent per annum.  
 
In examining the attractiveness of any oil or gas province, a prospective investor will take into many 
factors. The main ones will include: 
•  Basin prospectivity (the chance of finding oil or gas) 
•  Volumetric potential (how large are the discoveries) 
•  Basin cost structure (overall finding, development and operating costs per billion of oil 
equivalent) 
•  Access to infrastructure and opportunities 
•  The fiscal regime - its evolution, complexity and stability 
It is the balance of the above factors which will enable the investor to assess a basin’s or province’s 
competitiveness (Nakhle, 2007).  
 
Applying this template to the ‘established’ North Sea, volumetric potential is unlikely to feature 
significantly. This is because there is an insufficient resource base to attract larger oil company 
investment, particularly when other international opportunities are in keen competition for funds 
(Sassoon, 2003). Exploration and developments costs are also high. The North Sea may not provide 
the volume that satisfies larger investors, but it can provide value. The factors that will determine its 
future therefore lie much more in the area of oil price, technology and the fiscal regime. 
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3.1  Crude Oil Prices 
High oil prices have clearly helped in maintaining investment, as smaller fields that were 
previously considered uneconomic become more commercial. The increase in oil prices since 
2004 has been one of the major factors that encouraged greater interest in the North Sea. By 
2007, there were 143 active companies on the UKCS compared to 77 in 2001, with the 24
th 
license round seeing 17 new entrants (Westwood, 2007). Similarly, interest in the Norwegian 
shelf is as strong as ever. Exploration activity on the Norwegian shelf actually increased in 
2006 after several years of decline. The considerable interest shown in February 2007 
licensing round, confirms just how attractive the exploration acreage on the Norwegian shelf 
continues to be. Never before have so many production licenses been awarded on the 
Norwegian shelf. The licensing rounds in recent years also indicate that more and more new 
players are entering the Norwegian shelf (Norwegian Minister of Petroleum and Energy, 
2007). 
 
But, if recent years have been dominated by rising oil and gas prices, they have also been 
dominated by rising costs given the decline in production as well as the global competition 
for rigs and human resources which pushed the costs upwards. There are too many companies 
chasing too few dollars and too few rigs to meet demand (Westwood, 2007). As production 
declines it becomes increasingly challenging to sustain the competitiveness of a basin of this 
character. According to Oil & Gas UK (2007), if the UK is to make the most of its indigenous 
hydrocarbon resources and recover about 21 billion of barrels of oil equivalent (boe), it will 
be necessary for companies to invest £100s of billions in technically and commercially risky 
opportunities in a mature, high cost oil and gas province.  
 Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 17 of 25 
Paradoxically, high oil and gas prices both contributed to and constrained activity in the oil 
and gas sector in 2005. While they had the effect of making a greater volume of reserves 
economically attractive to recover, they also put pressure on resources and increased capital 
development and exploration and appraisal costs, reflecting a global trend (Oil & Gas UK, 
2006). As such, higher prices should be seen as a compensation for rising costs instead of an 
incentive for the government to raise taxes (Nakhle, 2007). Martin (1997) argues that higher 
oil prices if, considered alone, are not a sufficient variable to explain increase in production; 
technological and fiscal changes are key factors. 
 
3.2   The March of Technology 
Technological change on oil and gas exploration play a significant role in the offshore 
industry increasing reserves and lowering cost (Managi et al, 2005).  
 
The Norwegian companies have impressively developed their competences and technological 
knowledge on the NCS over the last 35 years. Today, technology developed on the NCS is 
utilized by the international oil and gas industry all over the world. Norway is the world's 
biggest operator of submarine gas pipelines. The giant concrete platforms of the 1970s and 
1980s were followed by floating production and sub-sea systems. Now comes the 
development of seabed separation and extended well stream transfer to onshore handling 
plants. The Hydro operated Ormen Lange field and the Statoil operated Snøhvit field are 
good examples of world class technologies developed in Norway over the last 35 years. 
  
Technology also helps to bring costs down, to make old fields look young again and to 
improve recovery rate. In 1995, the average recovery rate for oil in producing fields in the 
North Sea was approximately 40 per cent. In 2007, it became 46 per cent (NPD, 2007). Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 18 of 25 
Improved technology makes it possible to achieve profitable development of more resources. 
Technology also extends the lifetime of fields; it makes operations profitable even when 
production is low. 
 
3.3   The All-important Fiscal Context. 
Both oil prices and technology go beyond government’s control, unlike the fiscal regime. In 
countries where oil production has started to decline, fiscal regimes can be tuned to 
compensate for the decline in production by encouraging existing and new companies to 
sustain production and develop the remaining less profitable fields (Nakhle, 2007).  
 
There are close similarities in the structure of the fiscal regimes that apply in both the UK and 
Norway. Both countries apply a concessionary regime, where oil companies take title to 
produced oil at the wellhead and then pay the appropriate royalties and taxes
2 (Blinn et al, 
1986). The UK and Norwegian petroleum fiscal regimes include Royalty, special petroleum 
tax and corporate income tax. Royalty is based on the value of oil and gas extracted but it was 
abolished in both countries – in 1986 in Norway, and in 2002 in the UK
3. Royalty was 
abolished to encourage investment in oil and gas activity in both shelves. Since Royalty 
applies on gross revenues, it is a regressive tax that can render profitable projects unattractive 
on a post-tax basis, in addition to its up-front effect because it is imposed concurrent with the 
commencement of production.  
 
Given the perceived special characteristics of the oil sector, mainly the availability of 
economic rent, a special tax instrument applies to capture the windfall profits. The UK 
                                                 
2 The other main type of petroleum fiscal regime is the contractual regime where the government retains 
ownership of production while the international oil company operates at its own risk and expense under the 
control of the government. 
3 In the UK, Royalty was firstly abolished on fields that received development consent before 1983, then 
abolished on all fields in 2002 (Nakhle, 2006) Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 19 of 25 
applies Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) at 50 percent on fields that received development 
consent before 1993, and Norway applies Special Petroleum Tax (SPT) also at 50 percent. 
The corporate income tax that applies in both countries is the general tax that applies to all 
companies operating in the two countries respectively. The Norwegian Corporate Income tax 
(CIT) applies at a rate of 28 percent. In the UK, the Corporation Tax (CT) applies at a rate of 
30 percent, but in 2002 the UK Government introduced a Supplementary charge that applies 
at a rate of 10 percent on the same base as CT, and then in 2005 the UK Government doubled 
the charge to 20 percent, hence overall the corporate income tax applies at a rate of 50 
percent in the UK. But unlike PRT in the UK, the SPT is not deductible for CIT purposes, 
rendering the total tax take more significant compared with the UK. The effective marginal 
tax rate in Norway is 78 percent. In the UK, the effective marginal tax rates ranges between 
50 percent and 75 percent, as two structures applies - the first that applies to fields that 
received development consent after 1993, and it is based on 50 percent CT, the second 
applies to fields that received development consent before 1993: in addition of 50 percent 
CT, a 50 percent PRT applies. 
 
The Norwegian regime is often compared with the UK oil tax regime
4. Divergences have 
clearly emerged. The Norwegian regime is significantly simpler as one structure applies to all 
fields while in the UK two structures apply depending on the date of development consent of 
fields. The Norwegian petroleum fiscal regime is also much more stable. Since the 
establishment of the UKCS tax system in 1975, the regime has been repeatedly reviewed and 
many amendments applied. Rowland and Hann (1987) argue that no other sector in the UK 
economy has been subject to such fiscal instability. The missing element in the UK tax 
profile has been stability. Stability is an intangible yet crucial attribute of any fiscal regime. It 
                                                 
4 Robinson & Morgan (1978), Robinson & Rowland (1978), Brent (1991), Quinlan (1998) Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 20 of 25 
directly affects the confidence of investors in government policy, and this is particularly so in 
the case of petroleum extraction activity, where long-term projects are the norm.  
 
High level of government take is bound to cause problems where high-risk exploration and 
high-cost development are the norms, or in the case of those provinces with remaining 
modest petroleum potential, as is now the position in the North Sea. In the UK, the increase 
in taxation in 2005 reduced oil and gas activity attractiveness in the UK by 16 per cent (Oil & 
Gas UK, 2006). The cost of producing oil can overwhelm any price incentive. Large price 
incentives are needed to increase production while the costs of production are rising. The 
rapidly rising costs of operating in the North Sea, the global shortage of rigs and resources 
and high and unstable tax regimes all have the potential to frustrate companies’ plans and can 
lead to a failure to maximize the production of oil and gas. It is highly unwise for the 
authorities to assume that the North Sea will remain a preferred location for investment even 
at current high oil and gas prices (Oil & Gas UK, 2006). 
 
Controversy will always prevail when it comes to taxation, given the competing objectives of 
the two main players: governments normally seek to generate high levels of take from oil 
related activity while oil companies want to ensure an acceptable and sufficient level of 
profitability in their operations. But higher tax takes do not necessarily mean higher revenues. 
When the UK Government introduced the Supplementary Charge, they expected to generate 
an additional ₤2billion (bn) from oil activity in 2006-2007 as a result of the increase in tax. 
However, six months after the increase in tax, estimates were revised and the UK 
Government wrote off three-quarters of the ₤2bn originally expected revenues, in the light of 
the decreasing North Sea production (Giles and Hoyos, 2006). Then, in the space of further Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 21 of 25 
six months following the March 2006 Budget the UK Government further reduced the yield 
expectations from the North Sea by £2.8 bn in the tax years 2007-8 (HM Treasury, 2006). 
 
In the light of the conditions in the North Sea,  taxation, instead of deterring investment and 
production and leading indirectly to loss of fiscal revenues, could be used to the opposite 
effect, namely as an instrument to compensate for the decreasing attractiveness of the 
province, with respect to prospectivity and costs. By getting their priorities right, 
governments can encourage activity while sustaining a stable of flow of revenue. 
 
 
4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The analysis carried out in this paper on both the established North Sea province and the new 
potential opening further north confirms that the role of the entire area as a major oil and gas 
supplier is far from ending. Indeed, it could be only just beginning. As the potential unfolds, 
Europe’s energy prospects could be significantly improved, with sharply reduced reliance on 
imports from politically unreliable sources. 
 
It is true that UK North Sea oil and gas deposits have been depleted very fast in recent years 
but in the North Sea as a whole, including the Norwegian sector, further considerable 
discoveries are awaiting development. About one third of its oil and gas reserves, as currently 
identified, have not yet been produced.  
 
However, these prospects, while real and immediate, may be less significant than the truly 
large potential already opening out further North. It is the reserves estimated to exist in the Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 22 of 25 
Barents Sea region and under the Arctic ice which could both transform and stabilize the 
future oil and gas supply pattern for Europe and dramatically reduce current anxieties. 
 
Many powerful reasons exist for a highly positive approach to these future developments, 
both in the North Sea (on both the UK and Norwegian Continental Shelves) and in the High 
North. 
 
First, the likely continuance of a high world oil price is bound to be a significant factor. Many 
studies confirm that high oil prices are here to stay (Howell and Nakhle, 2007, IEA, 2007). 
Second, the continuing rapid development of petroleum technology is making, and will 
continue to make, an important contribution to increasing the activity level. It is this, 
alongside crude oil price prospects, that opens up the new possibilities for under-ice recovery 
so realistically. Third, it has been shown that significant potential remains on both sides of 
the established North Sea province, despite many commentaries tending to ‘write-off’ the 
North Sea’s future significance for European energy needs. Finally, the existing North Sea 
province enjoys an increasingly integrated and effective supply chain, backed strong and 
extensive infrastructure (Webb, 2007). In particular, the natural gas production platforms in 
the North Sea are well integrated by a network of domestic and international pipelines. This 
network facilitates the movement of natural gas both within the North Sea basin and exports 
to continental Europe. 
 
To the question ‘Can the North Sea Save Europe’ the answer is therefore ‘Yes, but’. Yes, the 
potential, both that remaining in the established North Sea province and that now plainly 
opening up further north, is there to transform Europe’s energy supply situation and meet the Can the North Sea Still Save Europe?   Page 23 of 25 
unavoidable expansion of  demand  for hydrocarbons, whatever the progress in low carbon 
alternatives. 
  
However the obstacles to this better future remain. Lack of determination, lack of vision, both 
commercial and political, lack of policy agility, poor fiscal policies and sterile geo-political 
perspectives can leave these new possibilities stillborn. Europe’s leaders and policy-makers, 
and their advisers, now have the responsibility to ensure that does not happen. 
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